322 research outputs found

    Receiver Front-Ends in CMOS with Ultra-Low Power Consumption

    Get PDF
    Historically, research on radio communication has focused on improving range and data rate. In the last decade, however, there has been an increasing demand for low power and low cost radios that can provide connectivity with small devices around us. They should be able to offer basic connectivity with a power consumption low enough to function extended periods of time on a single battery charge, or even energy scavenged from the surroundings. This work is focused on the design of ultra-low power receiver front-ends intended for a receiver operating in the 2.4GHz ISM band, having an active power consumption of 1mW and chip area of 1mm². Low power consumption and small size make it hard to achieve good sensitivity and tolerance to interference. This thesis starts with an introduction to the overall receiver specifications, low power radio and radio standards, front-end and LO generation architectures and building blocks, followed by the four included papers. Paper I demonstrates an inductorless front-end operating at 915MHz, including a frequency divider for quadrature LO generation. An LO generator operating at 2.4GHz is shown in Paper II, enabling a front-end operating above 2GHz. Papers III and IV contain circuits with combined front-end and LO generator operating at or above the full 2.45GHz target frequency. They use VCO and frequency divider topologies that offer efficient operation and low quadrature error. An efficient passive-mixer design with improved suppression of interference, enables an LNA-less design in Paper IV capable of operating without a SAW-filter

    Zoning: A Rebuttal to Village of Euclid Meets Agua Cliente

    Get PDF

    Quirin Revisited

    Get PDF
    In November 2001 President George W. Bush promulgated an Executive Order, premised on Ex Parte Quirin, that authorized the establishment of military commissions as well as purported to eliminate whatever jurisdiction federal courts might have by statute and to deny federal court access to individuals prosecuted or detained for terrorism. This article finds that the profound growth of federal habeas corpus over the last sixty years and the quite narrow holding in Quirin\u27s ultimate determination must guide contemporary application of the precedent. Also, it concludes that federal courts have power not only to assess military commissions\u27 validity in the abstract but also to review whether their treatment of particular defendants satisfied the constitution. The article evaluates the Bush Order that created the tribunals and ostensibly nullified federal court jurisdiction, while briefly explaining why the President lacks constitutional authority to preclude this jurisdiction. The decision is scrutinized, with the conclusion that the ruling should be confined to its peculiar facts. The article details federal habeas corpus\u27s evolution since the 1940s, asserting that must be modernized to conform with twenty-first century habeas corpus law. It surveys the types of issues that might be cognizable in a habeas corpus court, even though an anachronistic, unduly rigid and insupportably overbroad construction of may appear to prohibit their merits disposition. Note: This article was published before the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

    Youngstown Revisited

    Get PDF
    In 1952, President Harry S. Truman promulgated an Executive Order that authorized federal government seizure of the nation\u27s steel mills to support United States participation in the Korean conflict, but the Supreme Court held that Truman lacked any power to seize the property in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. In 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated an Executive Order that authorized trial by military commissions of non-U.S. citizens whom the American government suspects of terrorism in domestic cases and concomitantly denied these persons access to the federal courts. This article undertakes an analysis of the Bush Executive Order through the prism of Youngstown and ascertains that the president has no power to bar these domestic terrorism suspects from invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The article\u27s first section assesses relevant constitutional text, applicable history, and governing case precedent in exploring the development of the critical issues involved in the Bush Order. Next it evaluates legal measures that responded to the September 11 terrorist strikes, focusing on the USA PATRIOT ACT and the Bush Order. The third part examines the police action in Korea during the early 1950s. Next, Youngstown is applied to the Bush Order, showing that the directive is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction granted by federal statute. The article concludes by urging the Bush Administration not to invoke the Order\u27s provision that purportedly eliminates any federal court scrutiny of detainment or trials authorized by the directive. Note: This article was published before the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

    Youngstown Revisited

    Get PDF
    One half century ago, President Harry S. Truman promulgated an Executive Order that authorized federal government seizure and operation of the nation\u27s steel mills to support United States participation in the Korean conflict.1 The president relied on his power as commander-in-chief of American armed forces, other executive authority provided by Article II in the United States Constitution, the need for sustaining the American military effort, and temporal exigencies. Eight weeks later, the United States Supreme Court held that Truman lacked any power to seize the property of American steel companies in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated an Executive Order that authorized trial by military commissions of non-United States citizens whom the American government suspects of terrorism in domestic cases and concomitantly denied these persons access to the federal courts. Bush, like Truman, premised this action on executive power, namely his authority as commander-in-chief, the necessity to wage the war against terrorism following the September 11 attacks, and time restraints. Although, the respective presidential initiatives five decades apart can be distinguished, the two endeavors are in fact strikingly analogous. For example, both the Truman and Bush efforts raised profound separation of powers concerns. Both presidents resorted to their executive authority derived from Article II as justifications for extraordinary domestic actions, when fighting undeclared wars. The leaders, therefore, exercised legislative power in derogation of the Constitution\u27s express proviso that assigns Congress, not the president, lawmaking responsibility. The specific Bush Administration claim to executive authority would prescribe federal court jurisdiction, an enumerated power that Articles I and III confer on Congress in explicit terms, while it would proscribe even threshold judicial consideration of the initiative\u27s constitutionality. This assertion of authority is at once unsupported, imperial, and sweeping. Indeed, the November order could undermine not only legislative, but also judicial power, and, thus, jeopardize the finely wrought balance among the federal government\u27s tripartite, coequal branches. Because the Bush endeavor more substantially invades Congress\u27 province and concentrates federal authority in the president than the corresponding Truman Administration action, Youngstown applies with greater force to the fundamental questions the recent initiative presents. These propositions mean the Executive Order issued last November 13, 2001 warrants analysis through the prism of Youngstown on the landmark decision\u27s fiftieth anniversary. Our article undertakes this effort and ascertains that the president has no power to bar those individuals who are covered by the Bush Order from invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. We first explore the origins and development of the critical issues, which implicate the Constitution, judicial jurisdiction, and interbranch authority, and find that specific language in the Constitution bestows on Congress, rather than the chief executive, almost plenary power to establish the federal courts and to delineate their jurisdiction. The article next evaluates legal measures that responded to the September 11 terrorist strikes. Our focus is the USA PATRIOT ACT and the Bush Order for which we survey considerable background information. The third part examines the police action in Korea during the early 1950s. We canvass numerous presidential administrations\u27 requests that Congress authorize executive branch seizure of various industrial enterprises as a technique for settling labor-management disputes and review ways in which lawmakers treated these overtures. This segment then analyzes the Truman Administration order that seized the steel mills. The portion ends with an assessment of the Supreme Court opinion in Youngstown, which invalidated the seizure, and the meaning subsequently accorded that crucial decision. Section four applies Youngstown to the November Executive Order and ascertains that the directive is unconstitutional, insofar as it precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction granted by federal statute. The article concludes by urging the Bush Administration not to invoke the Order\u27s provision that purportedly eliminates any federal court scrutiny of, or intervention in, detainment or trials authorized by the directive. We believe that this assertion of power would erode legislative and judicial authority, upsetting the meticulously calibrated equilibrium among the federal government\u27s three coordinate branches

    Quirin Revisited

    Get PDF
    In November 2001 President George W. Bush promulgated an Executive Order, premised on Ex Parte Quirin, that authorized the establishment of military commissions as well as purported to eliminate whatever jurisdiction federal courts might have by statute and to deny federal court access to individuals prosecuted or detained for terrorism. This article finds that the profound growth of federal habeas corpus over the last sixty years and the quite narrow holding in Quirin\u27s ultimate determination must guide contemporary application of the precedent. Also, it concludes that federal courts have power not only to assess military commissions\u27 validity in the abstract but also to review whether their treatment of particular defendants satisfied the constitution. The article evaluates the Bush Order that created the tribunals and ostensibly nullified federal court jurisdiction, while briefly explaining why the President lacks constitutional authority to preclude this jurisdiction. The decision is scrutinized, with the conclusion that the ruling should be confined to its peculiar facts. The article details federal habeas corpus\u27s evolution since the 1940s, asserting that must be modernized to conform with twenty-first century habeas corpus law. It surveys the types of issues that might be cognizable in a habeas corpus court, even though an anachronistic, unduly rigid and insupportably overbroad construction of may appear to prohibit their merits disposition. Note: This article was published before the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

    Youngstown Revisited

    Get PDF
    In 1952, President Harry S. Truman promulgated an Executive Order that authorized federal government seizure of the nation\u27s steel mills to support United States participation in the Korean conflict, but the Supreme Court held that Truman lacked any power to seize the property in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. In 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated an Executive Order that authorized trial by military commissions of non-U.S. citizens whom the American government suspects of terrorism in domestic cases and concomitantly denied these persons access to the federal courts. This article undertakes an analysis of the Bush Executive Order through the prism of Youngstown and ascertains that the president has no power to bar these domestic terrorism suspects from invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The article\u27s first section assesses relevant constitutional text, applicable history, and governing case precedent in exploring the development of the critical issues involved in the Bush Order. Next it evaluates legal measures that responded to the September 11 terrorist strikes, focusing on the USA PATRIOT ACT and the Bush Order. The third part examines the police action in Korea during the early 1950s. Next, Youngstown is applied to the Bush Order, showing that the directive is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction granted by federal statute. The article concludes by urging the Bush Administration not to invoke the Order\u27s provision that purportedly eliminates any federal court scrutiny of detainment or trials authorized by the directive. Note: This article was published before the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

    Morphological Responses of Trees to Avalanches: a Comparison of On-path Vs Off-path Responses

    Get PDF
    Geograph

    Madison County, Kentucky Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Analysis

    Get PDF
    The results of a commodity flow analysis of hazardous materials for KY Highway 21 (KY-0021) and KY Highway 627 (KY-0627) conducted by Western Kentucky University, in partnership with the Madison County Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), are presented within this report. This report specifically focuses on the portions of these highways located in Madison County, Kentucky. Figure 1.1 shows the location of Madison County in relationship to the state of Kentucky. The purpose of this report is to present information regarding the patterns of hazardous materials transportation along KY-0021 and KY-0627 as observed from August 4, 2014 through August 15, 2014. This report also provides an analysis of incidents involving hazardous materials over the period of 2005 through 2014 in Madison County. Finally, this report summarizes these observations and provides recommendations based on these observations. The commodity flow analysis was necessary in order to provide the Madison County LEPC with information about hazardous materials transport patterns so that they can better prepare for potential incidents and releases of hazardous materials along KY-0021 and KY-0627. Analysis of hazmat incidents in Madison County provided an evaluation of significant hotspots where further risk assessments should be conducted. The data collected will assist in the emergency planning process by providing valuable information about frequently observed hazardous materials within the duration of the study
    corecore